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USURY-APPLICABILITY OF STATE USURY LAws TO INSTALLMENT SALES--
Plaintiff sued a vendor and a finance company to cancel a conditional sales 
contract and note, for return of payments made, and to obtain an un-
encumbered certificate of title to a house trailer. The trailer's cash price 
was 5,000 dollars and plaintiff had paid 1,250 dollars down. Charges of 
1,569 dollars were added, making the total time-price 6,569 dollars and 
leaving a time-balance of 5,319 dollars, payable in sixty monthly install-
ments.1 The contract and note were immediately assigned to the finance 
company. Plaintiff based his claim on Nebraska's Installment Loan Act,2 
alleging that the difference between the cash price and the time-price was 
usurious in exceeding nine percent.8 Defendants denied that the time-price 
1 Charges of $1,569 on $5,000, payable in sixty monthly installments, amount to a time-
price differential in excess of 12% per annum. 
2 NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 45-138(1) (Supp. 1961) provides: "No licensee shall directly or 
indirectly charge, contract for, or receive a greater rate of interest than nine per cent 
per annum upon any loan .•.• " NEB. REv. STAT. § 45-155 (1960) provides: "Violations of 
45-114 to 45-155 in connection with any indebtedness, however acquired, shall render such 
indebtedness void and uncollectable." 
a For the purposes of usury laws, a man who borrows SIOO and pays back $109 one 
year later has paid 9% interest. If, however, the same man borrows $100 and pays back 
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differential constituted interest within the meaning of the act. On appeal 
by the finance company from a judgment for plaintiff, held, affirmed, two 
judges concurring. A time-price differential in an installment sale, com-
puted by applying a schedule of rates to the cash price, constitutes interest 
subject to the nine-percent limitation of the Installment Loan Act. Lluyd v. 
Gutgsell, 175 Neb. 775, 124 N.W.2d 198 (1963). 
The decision in the principal case has attracted considerable national 
attention.4 In holding that the time-price differential in a credit sale is 
interest within the meaning of the state's usury law,5 and thereby effectively 
emasculating the traditional application of the time-price doctrine, the 
Nebraska court has called into question the validity of the vast majority of 
conditional sales contracts executed in Nebraska during the past four 
years. 6 According to the time-price doctrine, 7 the fact that the difference 
between the credit price and the cash price is in excess of the percentage 
allowed by the usury laws does not render a sales transaction usurious if 
the parties have acted in good faith.8 This position found early acceptance 
in the United States in the leading case of Hogg v. Ruffner.9 In asserting the 
right of the vendor to name one price for cash and another for credit, 
courts normally advance the rationale that the position of a purchaser 
and that of a borrower are not analogous. It has been suggested that while 
the borrower has little choice but to borrow, the purchaser has merely to 
refrain from buying, with no real need for the protection afforded by the 
usury laws.10 Hence, the applicability of the usury laws traditionally has 
$109 in twelve monthly installments, the interest rate is 18%, since he has had the use 
of the principal for only one-half the time. 
4 See, e.g., Time, Nov. 8, 1963, p. 76. 
l5 Prior to the principal case, Nebraska followed the policy of looking to the substance 
of each transaction to determine whether a particular sale was bona fide and therefore 
exempt from the usury laws, or merely a cloak for usury. See, e.g., Elder v. Doerr, 
175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W.2d 528 (1963); Wood v. Commonwealth Trailer Sales, Inc., 
172 Neb. 494, 110 N.W.2d 87 (1961); Robb v. Central Credit Corp., 169 Neb. 505, 100 
N.W.2d 57 (1959); Curtis v. Securities Acceptance Corp., 166 Neb. 815, 91 N.W.2d 19 
(1958); State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Discount Corp., 162 Neb. 683, 77 N.W.2d 215 (1956); 
Powell v. Edwards, 162 Neb. 11, 75 N.W.2d 122 (1956); Grand Island Fin. Co. v. Fowler, 
124 Neb. 514, 247 N.W. 429 (1933). See generally Note, 40 NEB. L. REv. 433 (1961). 
6 Judge Boslaugh, commenting on the court's failure to limit the decision to prospec-
tive application, said, "The effect of the language in the majority opinion is to destroy 
the validity of all time sale contracts which were made in good faith in reliance upon 
previous decisions of this court." Principal case at 785, 124 N.W .2d at 205 (concurring 
opinion). 
7 The time-price doctrine was first enunciated in Beete v. Bitgood, 7 B. 8e C. 453, 
108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1827). This case did away with apparently contradictory language 
in Dewar v. Span, 3 Term Rep. 425, 100 Eng. Rep. 656 (1789). 
s In its earliest application, the good faith limitation on the doctrine consisted of 
nothing more than a requirement that there be an actual sale, as distinct from a 
disguised usurious loan. 
9 66 U.S. (1 Black) 115 (1861). 
10 An often quoted statement to this effect is found in General Motors Acceptance 
Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 77-78, 262 S.W. 425, 428 (1924). 
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been limited to transactions involving a loan of money or forbearance to 
enforce a debt.11 
The time-price doctrine was firmly entrenched in the United States 
before the rapid transition to a credit-oriented economy which commenced 
after World War I.12 With this development, the time-price doctrine 
assumed a new vitality. It was held applicable to the classic situation 
wherein the vendor, after quoting a cash price which the buyer is unable to 
pay, applies a schedule of charges to the cash price, thereby determining the 
higher time:price. After a conditional sales contract is negotiated, the vendor 
assigns his rights under it to a finance company, which collects from the 
buyer in monthly installments.13 Decisions which deny the applicability of 
the usury laws to such a credit sale comprise the majority rule today,H 
and, as such, they constitute a curious anomaly. If a person borrows money 
from a finance company to purchase an automobile, the maximum rate of 
interest chargeable is strictly regulated by usury laws, which have been 
enacted in all but four states.15 If, however, the purchase is made on time, 
the purchaser may pay up to six times as much in carrying charges to the 
very same finance company, as assignee of the vendor, since the usury laws 
are held inapplicable to the transaction. Cognizant of the increasing 
popularity of the credit sale and the opportunities it afforded for sub-
verting the policy underlying the usury laws, some courts began to whittle 
away at the time-price doctrine.16 Generally, this took the form of limiting 
11 See, e.g., Brooks v. Auto Wholesalers, Inc., 101 A.2d 255 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 
1953); Bryant v. Securities Investment Co., 233 Miss. 740, 102 So. 2d 701 (1958); General 
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, supra note 10; Carolina Industrial Bank v. 
Merrimon, 260 N.C. 335, 132 S.E.2d 692 (1963). 
12 For a review of the startling rise of credit sales in the United States, see Comment, 
45 MARQ. L. REv. 555 (1962). 
' 13 See, e.g., Commercial Credit Co. v. Tarwater, 215 Ala. 123, 110 So. 39 (1926); 
Rose v. Wheeler, 140 Cal. App. 217, 35 P.2d 220 (1934); Zazzaro v. Colonial Acceptance 
Corp., 117 Conn. 251, 167 Atl. 734 (1933); Robrock v. Ditzler, 113 Ind. App. 332, 47 N.E.2d 
613 (1943); Henry v. P &: E Fin. Co., 197 Okla. 676, 174 P.2d 373 (1946); Hafer v. Spaeth, 22 
Wash. 2d 378, 156 P.2d 408 (1945). 
14 See, e.g., Brooks v. Auto Wholesalers, Inc., 101 A.2d 255 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1953); 
Newkirk v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 93 Ga. App. 1, 90 S.E.2d 618 (1955); Bell v. 
Idaho Fin. Co., 75 Idaho 560, 255 P.2d 715 (1953); Black v. Contract Purchase Corp., 327 
Mich. 636, 42 N.W .2d 768 (1950); Van Asperen v. Darling Olds, Inc., 254 Minn. 62, 
93 N.W .2d 690 (1958); Bryant v. Securities Investment Co., 233 Miss. 740, 102 So. 2d 701 
(1958); Thomas v. Knickerbocker Operating Co., 202 Misc. 286, 108 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. 
1951); Carolina Industrial Bank v. Merrimon, 260 N.C. 335, 132 S.E.2d 692 (1963); Luchesi 
v. Capitol Loan &: Fin. Co., 83 R.I. 151, 113 A.2d 725 (1955). In addition, the time-price 
doctrine has been enacted into statute in Texas and Colorado. TEX. REv. STAT. ANN. art. 
5074a (Supp. 1959); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-16-1(8) (Supp. 1957). 
15 Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts and New Hampshire. 
16 See Seebold v. Eustermann, 216 Minn. 566, 13 N.W .2d 739 (1944). In Hare v. General 
Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W .2d 973 (1952), the court prospectively 
overruled, by caveat, cases upholding the unqualified application of the time-price 
doctrine. The court held it a question of fact whether the seller increased his cash price 
with reasonable assurance that he could discount his paper to a loan company. When 
that assurance is found and the time-price differential exceeds 10%, the transaction is 
a usurious loan. For Arkansas cases subsequent to the caveat in Hare, supra, see Crawford 
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its applicability in certain cases by an examination of the substance of the 
transaction, rather than its form, to determine whether it was a mere cloak 
for usury.17 Typical of these situations were those in which the buyer 
actually contracted with the finance company,18 or where there was an 
inordinate degree of cooperation between the vendor and the finance 
company.19 Usury has also been found where the vendor failed to quote 
an actual time-price20 and where the original contract obligation was later 
refinanced by the finance company.21 Nevertheless, credit sales have gen-
erally remained exempt from the strictures of the usury laws, and cases 
holding that such a transaction is tainted are relatively few in number. 
The decision in the principal case is significant not only in breaking 
with the traditional application of the time-price doctrine to credit sales, 
but in doing so retroactively.22 The effect on vendors and finance com-
panies which have relied on the validity of the doctrine in executing con-
ditional sales contracts is likely to be unduly harsh, since a finding of 
usury in Nebraska results in a loss of the property sold, as well as the 
principal and interest paid and owing.23 Implicit in the decision is the 
premise that little, if any, distinction exists between the borrower and the 
time-payment purchaser in an economy where credit sales have become a 
way of life. This court recognized, as have others, the need for extending 
protection to consumers whose bargaining power is most often inconse-
v. General Contract Corp., 174 F. Supp. 283 (W.D. Ark. 1959); Universal C.I.T. Credit 
Corp. v. Lackey, 228 Ark. 101, 305 S.W .2d 858 (1957); Thompson v. Murdock Acceptance 
Corp., 223 Ark. 483, 267 S.W .2d 11 (1954); Murdock Acceptance Corp. v. Clift, 22 Ark. 
313,259 S.W.2d 517 (1953). 
17 "The theory that a contract will be usurious or not, according to the kind of 
paper bag it is put up in ••• is altogether erroneous. The law intends that a search for 
usury shall penetrate the substance." Pope v. Marshall, 78 Ga. 635, 640, 4 S.E. 116, 118 
(1887). 
18 Jackson v. Commercial Credit Corp., 90 Ga. App. 352, 83 S.E.2d 76 (1954); Nazarian 
v. Lincoln Fin. Corp., 77 R.I. 497, 78 A.2d 7 (1951). 
10 Factors which have been considered significant are the finance company's providing 
the forms, setting the rates, furnishing rate tables, or conducting the credit check; 
immediate assignment by the vendor; and joint ownership of the sales agency and finance 
company. See Crawford v. General Contract Corp., 174 F. Supp. 283 (W.D. Ark. 1959); 
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Lackey, 228 Ark. 101, 305 S.W.2d 858 (1957); Powell v. 
Edwards, 162 Neb. 11, 75 N.W .2d 122 (1956), But cf. Luchesi v. Capitol Loan &: Fin. Co., 
83 R.I. 151, 113 A.2d 725 (1955), where the time-price doctrine was applied despite the 
fact that one man was president of both the sales agency and the lending organization. 
20 Daniel v. First Nat'l Bank, 227 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955); Robb v. Central Credit 
Corp., 169 Neb. 505, 100 N.W .2d 57 (1959); Curtis v. Securities Acceptance Corp., 166 Neb. 
815, 91 N.W .2d 19 (1958). 
21 Wood v. Commonwealth Trailer Sales, Inc., 172 Neb. 494, 110 N.W.2d 87 (1961); 
State ex rel. Beck v. Associates Discount Corp., 162 Neb. 683, 77 N.W.2d 215 (1956); 
Associates Discount Corp. v. Ruddock, 244 Miss. 533, 81 So. 2d 249 (1955). 
22 Cases following Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W .2d 
973 (1952), applied its caveat only to transactions occurring subsequent to the decree in 
Hare. See, e.g., Murdock Acceptance Corp. v. Clift, 222 Ark. 313, 259 S.W.2d 517 (1953). 
28 NEB, REv. STAT, § 45-155 (Supp. 1961). 
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quential.24 While the inconsistency inherent in providing protection for 
one class of debtors and withholding it from another may be conceded, 
it is questionable whether the most prudent solution lies in judicial 
extinction of the time-price doctrine. The primary advantage of the doc-
trine is its beneficial effect in encouraging a sufficient supply of risk capital 
to finance installment credit. Financial concerns, however, contend that 
the statutory interest rates for money loans in the majority of states are 
inadequate to compensate for the costs involved in financing credit sales.25 
The lack of ready financing would necessarily force the vendor to reduce 
his volume of credit sales to a level which he could carry personally, a 
result which hopefully is to be avoided. It is pertinent to note that since 
the decision in the principal case, several large finance companies have 
suspended operations in Nebraska, and sales of new and used automobiles 
have slumped from lack of financing.26 
Specific legislation suggests itself as an alternative to application of the 
usury laws in an area where they were not intended to operate. Such 
legislation, embodying the premise that money loans and credit sales are 
dissimilar in some aspects, would have to balance protection of the credft 
purchaser against the necessity of maintaining a climate conducive to the 
profitable financing of installment credit. Unfortunately, this path seems 
to be blocked in Nebraska, where a statute purporting to fix the maximum 
time-price differential in installment sales was held to violate the Nebraska 
Constitution as establishing a special interest rate applicable to only a 
specific type of transaction.27 Another alternative would be to raise the 
statutory maximum interest rates provided by the usury laws, but this has 
the objectionable feature of increasing those rates beyond what has been 
found to be necessary and equitable for money loans. Moreover, such an 
alternative would require constitutional amendment in some states.28 
Despite these drawbacks to a legislative solution, the courts should await 
the determination of the legislature, rather than overruling the traditional 
application of the time-price doctrine to credit sales. Even under this 
24 See Consumer Credit Symposium: Development in the Law, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 301, 
304 (1960). 
21'.i See Ecker, Usury in Installment Sales, 2 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 173, 185 (1935). 
At present the statutory limits on interest rates for larger loans in most of the states 
range between 6% and 10%. See Note, 8 ARK. L. REv. 420, 428-31 (1954). 
26 Time, Nov. 8, 1963, p. 76. 
27 The Nebraska Installment Sales Act, NEB. R.Ev. STAT. § 45-305 (1960), was held 
unconstitutional in Elder v. Doerr, 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W.2d 528 (1963). The statute was 
found to be an unreasonable classification, violative of NEB. CONST. art. 3, § 18, which 
prohibits the passing of special laws regulating the interest on money. The Elder decision 
is a precursor of the principal case in equating the time-price differential with interest, 
thus bringing the act under the constitutional prohibition against special interest rates. 
However, the parties stipulated to this identity, and the court assumed the point without 
discussion. 
28 Maximum interest rates for money loans are constitutionally fixed in Arkansas 
(ARK. CoNST. art. 19, § 13), California (CAL. CONST. art. 20, § 22), Oklahoma (OKLA. CONST. 
art. XIV, § 2), Tennessee (TENN. CONST. art. II, § 7), and Texas (TEXAS CONST. art. 3, § 56). 
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view, the purchaser has some protection, in that the transaction is void-
able if it may be construed as usurious in substance. Certainly, if a court 
is constrained to act, its ruling should not be applied to those transactions 
entered into prior to the decree.29 
John H. Blish 
29 That the principal case was a proper one for a prospective overruling only would 
seem to be evident from the number and importance of contracts executed in reliance 
on the validity of the time-price doctrine. See Note, 60 HARv. L. REv. 437, 441-42 (1947), 
where the writer discusses the frequent prospective application of judgments overruling a 
prior decision in situations where contracts have been formed in reliance on that decision. 
